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Summary
Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell
launched a ferocious attack on B.C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Con-
structive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we con-
clude from this silence that no defence is possible against the attack and that a
fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all, or is the attack too obviously
flawed as not to merit exposure? We believe that neither is the case and hope
that a careful dissection of Maxwell’s reasoning will make this clear. This dis-
section includes an analysis of Maxwell’s ‘aberrance-argument’ (omnipresent
in his many writings) for the contentious claim that science implicitly and per-
manently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the universe. This claim
generally has been ignored too, for more than a quarter of a century. Our con-
clusions will be that, first, Maxwell’s attacks on CE can be beaten off; secondly,
his ‘aberrance-arguments’ do not establish what Maxwell believes they estab-
lish; but, thirdly, we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks
about the nature of science and of the libertarian nature of CE.
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1 Exordium: What is Maxwell's Argument?
The Argument. Building on work dating from the early 1970s, N. Maxwell has expounded,
in a sequence of papers and in books, a metaphysical-realist conception of science awk-
wardly named ‘Aim-Oriented Empiricism’.1 Logically prior to the exposition and defence
of his novel conception of science, Maxwell claims to have “decisive grounds” for reject-
ing a conception of science called ‘Standard Empiricism’, of which Van Fraassen’s ‘Con-
structive Empiricism’ is purportedly a version; thereby the need is created for a novel
conception (Aim-Oriented Empiricism, then, is supposed to satisfy this need).2 The sole
purpose of the present paper is to analyse Maxwell’s “decisive” argument against Con-
structive Empiricism (henceforth: the Argument); part and parcel of his Argument is his
‘aberrance-argument’ for the claim that science permanently makes a substantial meta-
physical assumption about the nature of the universe.3
We begin with a definition of a view of science called
Standard Empiricism (SE). (SE1) Science4 does not accept any permanent, substan-
tial, metaphysical assumptions about the universe (independent of the evidence and cer-
tainly never in violation of the evidence); and (SE2) the decision to accept or reject a
scientific theory is based exclusively on the available evidence.
(1)
Presumably SE2 entails SE1, although that will depend on what is meant by ‘metaphysi-
cal’; until further notice we shall keep both SE1 and SE2 for ease of reference and take
them to be a jointly exhaustive characterisation of SE. The global logical structure of
Maxwell’s Argument against Standard and Constructive Empiricism is as follows.5
P1 Maxwell’s Thesis. Science permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about
the nature of the universe.
C1 Science contradicts Standard Empiricism — from P1 and SE1.
P2 Constructive Empiricism is a version of Standard Empiricism, i.e. it meets both con-
ditions SE1 and SE2 of SE (1).
C2 Science also contradicts Constructive Empiricism — from C1 and P2.
1Maxwell (1974), (1993), (1998), (2002).
2Maxwell (1993: 61, 81), (1998: 36-38), (2002: 3-5); for Constructive Empiricism, see Fraassen (1980),
(1989).
3Since the Argument motivates Maxwell’s own view of science and therefore is logically prior to it, we
can and shall ignore Maxwell’s ‘aim-oriented-empiricism’. See Smart (2000) and Muller (2003) for reviews
of Maxwell (1998).
4For the sake of brevity, by ‘science’ we mean in the Argument ‘the (overwhelming majority of the)
scientific community’ unless specifically stated otherwise.
5Maxwell (1974: 131), (1993: 65, 68-69, 78), (1998: 46-54), (2002: 3-5).
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C3 Standard Empiricism must be rejected — from C1 —, and then, by virtue of C2,
Constructive Empiricism must also be rejected.
Preliminary Comments. The following comments provide us with the opportunity to
give a preview of the present paper.
(i) A warning is in order: Maxwell’s wording of SE and other theses and notions can
differ subtly from one publication to another. We start with the most simple and straight-
forward wordings and analyse his arguments with these wordings; as we proceed, other
wordings will be considered and the bearing of these other wordings on the Argument
and our analyses will be investigated (specifically in Sections 3.3 and 3.5). For reasons of
exposition it has turned out best to begin with SE as it stands (1).
(ii) We shall assume that throughout the Argument ‘acceptance’ is used in Van Fraassen’s
pragmatic sense of acceptance simpliciter. Acceptance is, then, taken to be the mental state
guiding our behaviour and is (supposed to be) devoid of any overtly epistemic connota-
tions, such as when we consider an accepted proposition to be part of scientific knowledge
or believing it to be true (although for Van Fraassen, acceptance admittedly has epistemic
implications; cf. Section 3.1).6 We must proceed in this fashion in order not to let Maxwell
ab ovo commit the fallacy of equivocation with respect to (Van Fraassen’s notion of) accep-
tance. In Section 3.5, we briefly explore four other notions of ‘acceptance’, some of which
are overtly epistemic.
(iii) Notice that logically speaking only SE1 of SE (1) is needed in the Argument, which
implies that criticisms restricted to SE2 (1) are doomed. Maxwell (1993: 65) located SE2,
for instance, in K.R. Popper’s Conjectures and Refutations.7
(iv) Logic alone does not dictate anyone to reject any form of empiricism when it con-
tradicts science (C1, C2), so more than logic is required to vindicate the final step of the
Argument (C3); we shall see, however, that the nature of the contradiction is such that we
shall unhesitatingly rule in favour of science to save us from the putative inconsistency.
(v) In general, a conclusion cannot be more convincing than any of its premises. In case
of the Argument, these are premises P1 (Maxwell’s Thesis) and P2; both of them obviously
stand in need of argument in order to produce a convincing Argument. Premise P1 seems
to say nothing less than that every scientists is a metaphysical realist of sorts!
Preview. In Section 2, we analyse Maxwell’s reasoning in favour of Maxwell’s The-
sis, which is premise P1 of the Argument, and judge it unconvincing. We claim that in
6We call a declarative sentence a statement, and classes of logically equivalent statements propositions.
We shall confuse ‘statement’ and ‘proposition’ on a regular basis and we apologise for that in advance.
7Popper (1963: 54): “the principle of empiricism which asserst that in science, only observation and exper-
iment may decide upon the acceptance and rejection of scientific statements, including laws and theories.”
Popper considers replacing this principle with some ‘metaphysical principle’ and says about this: “I have
never seen any formulation which even looked promising or was not clearly untenable.” (ibid.) Cf. Maxwell
(1998: 2-3, 38-45) on the topic of how widely SE is held.
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Maxwell’s writings two distinct ‘aberrance-arguments’ in favour of premise P1 can be
discerned; the first is an abductive argument, the second a deductive argument.8 In Sec-
tion 3, we argue that Constructive Empiricism (CE) is, properly conceived, not a version of
SE, which means we must reject premise P2. Thus our conclusion will be that Maxwell’s
attack against CE fails. Briefly, Section 2 is devoted to premise P1 and Section 3 to premise
P2 of the Argument. In Section 4, we present the results of our analyses and the lessons
we have learned along the way. These lessons show that Maxwell’s attack has not been
in vain but has taught us a thing or four about science and CE.
2 Does Science Implicitly Accept Metaphysics?
In this Section we analyse the two aberrance-arguments in favour of (P1) Maxwell’s The-
sis. Below we shall proceed by collecting step-wise the premises of the two aberrance-
arguments we have discerned so as to reach a position where we can assess them.
2.1 Aberrant Theories
Although the aberrance-argument is supposed to apply to science generally, we restrict
ourselves to physics, as Maxwell does. We first explain the concept of an ‘aberrant ver-
sion’ of a scientific theory.9
Consider Newton’s theory of universal Gravitation (NG). Consider a so-called aber-
rant version of it which says exactly the same as NG save for golden spheres having a
radius of exactly 13 km, for which a different law of gravitation is postulated, saying that
the gravitational force is repulsive (NG1), or varies with the inverse-cube of the distance
between the spheres (NG2). Consider a version of NG which is different from NG only in
that r−2 in Newton’s law of gravitation is replaced with r−(2+ε), where ε is an extremely
small positive number, say a power of 10 such that log ε = −10100 (NG3). A Humean
8Personal comment. Maxwell prefers a rough style of arguing and does not prefer to use jargon. Some-
times I have the impression that Maxwell’s prose exhales disdain for an unambiguous, precise statement
of the premises and the conclusion of an argument, for a careful preliminary discussion of the concepts in-
volved so as to reach an appreciable level of clarity about their meanings, and for a step-wise explication of
the reasoning saying in each step which premise is used and how. Let me hasten to add that this is not true
of Maxwell’s work generally, because he is the only extant philosopher of science who has tried to define
what the ‘simplicity’ of a scientific theory resides in, in terms of what the theory says about the world rather
than how it is being said; see (1998: 51-54, 104-109). But when it comes to his aberrance-argument, this is
true: in trying to understand this argument precisely, I felt more like being on a fishing expedition rather
than reading an argument of a philosopher who had done his homework.
9All accepted scientific theories are not aberrant. Although Maxwell makes an exception for quantum
mechanics (1998: 228-229), we joint him in ignoring this when considering the aberrance-argument.
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nightmare version of NG is NG but in the year 3,000 A.D. the gravitational force will dis-
appear completely in the entire universe (NG4); then some day in that year the sun will
not rise tomorrow. Next we have a theory that postulates two universal forces between
every two bodies, an attractive ‘gavitational force’, which is twice as strong as the gravita-
tional force of NG, and a repulsive ‘ravitational force’, which has the same strength as the
gravitational force (NG5); so whenever we consider two bodies in accordance to NG5, we
always have the sum of the gavitational and the ravitational force (for convenience con-
tracted to ‘gravitational force’). We also have a version of NG that says the same as NG
but for a spatio-temporal region whose spatial part has the size of a marble and whose
temporal part is about 1 nanosecond; in this region, located in the Andromeda Nebula
during Easter 37 A.D., there is no gravity (NG6). Finally we have a theory like NG but
for a two-body system like the Sun and Mercury it postulates a precession of its perihelia
which is in exact agreement with observations (NG7).10 Notice that NG1-NG4 almost cer-
tainly are empirically false (i.e. do not save all the relevant phenomena), although we shall
never be absolutely certain about it; NG5 is empirically equivalent to (but ontologically
distinct from) NG; NG6 is almost empirically equivalent to NG; and NG7 is empirically
more successful than NG because NG7 saves at least one more phenomenon than NG
does.
We can go on like this endlessly. We can play this aberrance game with every single
accepted physical theory. David Hume can be seen as the first player; Nelson Goodman,
with his grue-bleen moves, is another famous player; Maxwell boasts of being a contem-
porary player.11 The imagination is the limit and that is no limit at all. For want of a
name, we call regular all non-aberrant theories, such as NG, classical mechanics, classical
electrodynamics, the special theory of relativity, etc., i.e. such as all actually accepted the-
ories.12 For those who worry about theories of which it is not easy to say whether they
are aberrant or regular: do not worry, everything asserted in this paper goes through if
you take for ‘aberrant’ theories only the utterly bizarre ones (there is an infinitude of them
too and this is sufficient to get the aberrance-argument going).
Maxwell’s aberrance-arguments in favour of premise P1, Maxwell’s Thesis, can be found
10Cf. Maxwell (1993: 68-70), (1998: 51-55).
11Maxwell (1974: 128-131), (1993: 67-69, 89), (1998: 47-54), (2002: 3-5).
12For further discussion of the distinction regular/aberrant, including a more-or-less precise definition, and
of why aberrant theories have to be taken seriously (Hume, Goodman and their commentators did), we
refer to Maxwell (1998: 47-56) and Kukla (2001). The very fact that a more-or-less precise definition of
‘aberrant’ can be given removes a worry that may have arisen, namely that of the explanation of ‘an aberrant
version of’ were to rely on a regular theory being given first, this would make the explanation circular
because ‘regular’ is supposed to mean ‘not aberrant’. The reasons why we have explained ‘abberancy’ by
means of presenting examples are pedagogical and spatio-temporal — Maxwell’s definition (ibid.) is rather
elaborate.
4
in various places.13 Indulge us one quotation in full from the present journal:
But now comes the decisive point. In persistently rejecting infinitely many such em-
pirically successful but grotesquely ad hoc [= aberrant, FAM] theories, science in effect
makes a big permanent assumption about the nature of the universe, to the effect that
it is such that no grotesquely ad hoc theory is true, however empirically successful it
may appear to be for a time. Without such a big assumption as this, the empirical
method of science collapses. Science is drowned in an infinite ocean of empirically
successful ad hoc theories.14
We begin our analysis of the first aberrance-argument by reporting the undeniable fact
that science only accepts regular theories and dismisses aberrant (utterly bizarre) theories
without a moment’s thought; aberrant theories rarely if ever enter the scientific competi-
tion of acceptance and rejection; they seem a typical product of the philosophical imagi-
nation run wild. Therefore the first premise of the aberrance-argument is an undeniable
truth:
Ab. Science rejects all aberrant theories and accepts only regular theories. (2)
For the sake of future reference, we also formulate the following two theses:
U. The universe is comprehensible, which by definition means that it is such that it
makes all aberrant theories false.15
(3)
And
EmpU. The universe is empirically comprehensible, which by definition means that it
is such that it makes all aberrant theories empirically false, or synonymously empirically
inadequate, which is to say that the universe is such that no aberrant theory saves all the
phenomena it is supposed to save.
(4)
Obviously U implies EmpU but not conversely. Entertaining or accepting or considering
any of these theses presupposes it makes sense to utter expressions like ‘the universe is
such that ...’, ‘the universe is constituted in a certain way’ and sibling expressions; to
emphasise, judging such expressions to be meaningful does not presuppose that (one has
to believe that) they are true (or false or neither).
13Maxwell (1974: 128-131), (1993: 67-78), (1998: 47-64).
14Maxwell (2002: 4-5).
15No claim is being made that the definition of ‘comprehensible’ is in full agreement with everyday use;
we need a name for the predicate described in U and we have chosen ‘comprehensible’ because Maxwell
has chosen it. Notice that U is what Maxwell asserts in the displayed quotation above: “no grotesquely ad
hoc theory is true”.
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Both theses U and EmpU talk about ‘falsehood’. About the concept of truth we should
assume as little as possible. Let us assume no more than this:
Truth. Scientific theory T is true iff the universe is such that it is like T says it is; and
T is false iff the universe is unlike T says it is.
(5)
It seems that this is exactly what we mean when we say that T is true — although one
need not accept this additional explicatory gloss put on Truth in order to accept Truth
(5). Rather than ‘true’, one could say ‘ontologically adequate’, because Truth (5), just
like thesis U (3) and EmpU (4), presupposes it is meaningful to utter expressions like ‘the
universe is such that ...’, etc.16
2.2 Only Methodological Assumptions?
To find out whether science (implicitly) accepts some thesis, one could, it seems, simply
ask a representative sample of scientists whether they accept the thesis or not. But when
it is some metaphysical thesis, a poll will not work, Maxwell submits, because scientists
are brain-washed with SE (1), the ‘official ideology of science’; they will deny they accept
any metaphysical thesis about the universe (SE1).17 Scientists believe — falsely according
to Maxwell (1974: 126) — that criticising SE is an act of scientific betrayal. Until further
notice we shall not challenge Maxwell’s problematic charge of all scientists suffering from
a ‘false consciousness’ (perhaps Oprah Winfrey should have a long talk with our scien-
tists, pronouncing her immortal words: ‘Denial is not a river in Egypt.’). We propose to
get around the problem in the only way conceivable: by explictily postulating a certain
connexion between the observable behaviour of scientists, as reported in Ab (2), and un-
observable assumption-making of scientists in their minds, because this is what Maxwell
is surreptitiously doing. First we write down this postulate; then we explain it.
Acc. IF someone follows method M to reach aim A, and expects that following this
method will help him considerably in reaching aim A, THEN he accepts the concomi-
tant methodological assumption U[M,A], which asserts that the universe is such that
following method M is of considerable help in reaching A.
(6)
Surely it is not straightforward to read off which assumptions Albert, say, is mak-
ing from the methods he follows, for distinct assumptions may lead to exactly the same
behaviour. In the light of rampant Duhem-Quine indeterminacy (which parenthetically
16Those who hold that only a theory plus an ontology can tell us what the universe is like, rather than
a ‘bare theory’, can take ‘T’ to stand for ‘T dressed with some ontology’. Such a change will not affect the
arguments in this paper in any significant sense.
17Maxwell (1974: 126), (1998: 41-43), (2002: 24). Whether all scientists actually subscribe to SE (1) is for
us an open question. Not an open question for us is whether there is a living philosopher of science who
defends SE2 (1) — there isn’t any.
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militates heavily against SE), on could even turn the tables and defend the opposite: ob-
servable behaviour does not determine what goes on in the head. Nonetheless there are
cases and circumstances where this can be done beyond reasonable doubt. For example, con-
sider Albert throwing water in the waste-paper basket besides his desk which has caught
fire because in a moment of absent-mindedness he threw in it what was left of a tasty
Cuban cigar. Can we infer from his behaviour that Albert accepts the Assumption that the
universe is such that water extinguishes fire? Presumably we can. But now suppose there
happened to be standing an oil-can next to a bucket filled with water. Suppose further
that Albert (whose ignorance about mundance matters is legendary) later declares he did
not have clue whether oil or water extinguishes fire, or both, or neither, and that it was
sheer luck that he chose to empty the bucket of water on the burning waste-paper basket.
In this case the ascription of the Assumption to Albert is wrong after all. But if Albert tells
us he expected to be successful with water and adds, with raised eyebrows, that of course
he would have made the situation much worse if he had thrown oil on the flames instead,
then the inference to Albert making the Assumption is wholly correct.
So it seems that, to generalise cautiously, if someone applies method M to achieve
aim A, and expects that applying method M will considerably help to achieve aim A (if
not guarantee success), then he accepts what we shall call the methodological assumption
U[M,A] of method M given aim A: the universe is such that applying method M helps to
achieve aim A; the height of someone’s expectations is a measure of how confident he is
in accepting U[M,A].18 Well, this is precisely assumption Acc (6). But now the problem
is: how do we know what someone expects? We can observe whether someone applies
a method, or goes against it, but we cannot observe what his expectations are. They are
in his mind. Duhem-Quine indeterminacy strikes again. Someone may apply a method
without cherishing any expectations about its outcome whatsoever (as we have seen in
the example with Albert); in that case no assumptions about the universe are made. In
such a case one often speaks of a ‘working-hypothesis’. What we need is some connexion
between observable behaviour and unobservable expectations.
Consider the following methodological rule (Maxwell’s example):
R. If a theory does not explicitly assume that all matter consists of atoms (in the
etymological sense) and it does not describe how matter interacts by means of
contact forces alone, then reject the theory.
(7)
18Cf. Maxwell (1998: 10). Notice that every assumption, metaphysical or not, that can be the basis of a rule
of how to achieve a particular aim is a methodological assumption. To say that methodological assumptons
are not metaphysical is to utter a falsehood.
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The concomitant methodological assumption is as follows:
U[R,A]. Matter is not infinitely divisible, but consists of building blocks that
cannot be divided further (the atoms), and that pieces of matter, atoms included,
influence other pieces of matter only by means of contact forces, i.e. only when
they touch each other.
(8)
Here aimA is the epistemic aim of science and it matters little what one takesA to be: on-
tological adequacy (truth), empirical adequacy (empirical truth), explanatory adequacy,
and what have you. Now suppose that all physicists apply rule R (7) scrupulously, time
and again, without exception, so that theories assuming the infinite divisibility of mat-
ter, theories that operate with action-at-a-distance or with fields, and what theories have
you, are all rejected flat out of hand by the scientific community, and that only atomistic-
mechanistic theories are taken seriously. In this supposed situation we need not inquire
whether physicists have higher expectations to be successful when applying rule R (7)
than when they break it (no matter how one construes the aim of physics); it is evident
that they do. Actions speak louder than words. Methodological assumption U[R,A] (8)
surely is accepted. This is no different than when we infer from the observable behaviour
of firefighters when there is a fire that they accept the assumption that the universe is
such that throwing water on fires extinguishes them. So let us lay down the following
general premise:
Exp. IF someone always follows method M, and never goes against M although noth-
ing prevents him from doing so, THEN he has higher expectations to be successful when
following M than when going against M.
(9)
Assumption Exp (9) postulates a plausible connexion between recurring observable be-
haviour and unobservable expectations. Exp applied to the supposed behaviour of the
scientific community sketched above leads to the conclusion that the community accepts
an atomistic-mechanistic ontology U[R,A].
When we now combine Acc (6) and Exp (9) and apply it to science, we obtain:
AccExp. IF science always follows methodM (for reaching some aim,A say), and never
goes against it although nothing prevents science from doing so, THEN science accepts
the concomitant methodological assumption U[M,A], which asserts that the universe
is such that following method M is of considerable help (for reaching A).
(10)
The three premises we have gathered so far, Ab (2), Acc (6) and Exp (9), immediately
throw a conclusion into our lap via consequence AccExp (10): thesis U (3) is the method-
ological assumption of a method that science always follows and never breaks according to
Ab (2):
Lemma I. Science permanently accepts thesis U (3). (11)
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To arrive at premise P1 of the Argument from this Lemma I, we must argue that thesis
U (3) is both substantial and metaphysical. We take these attributes in turn.
2.3 What is a Substantial Thesis?
When we agree to call a thesis ‘substantial’ in a particular context iff accepting or rejecting
it has consequences that are generally recognised as important in that context, so that it
‘makes a difference’, then thesis U (3) is substantial if Maxwell is right that U is a nec-
essary condition for the possibility of science. No thesis U, no science. Science being
possible or impossible is the biggest difference one can imagine in the philosophy of sci-
ence: no science, no philosophy of science! So let us focus on this particular ‘important
consequence’ so as to make a thesis substantial:
If accepting a thesis is a necessary condition for the possibility of science, then it is a
substantial thesis.
(12)
Maxwell essentially has erected a ‘transcendental deduction’ to argue that if science
were not to reject all aberrant theories in a single sweep but were to take them seriously,
then scientific research and a fortiori scientific progress would come to an end, because
scientists would drown in an ocean of aberrant theories of which each one would have
to be tested before it could be rejected.19 This testing, however, only works for aberrant
theories that are empirically distinct from their regular sibling; science could not get rid
of aberrant theories this way that are empirically equivalent to the regular theory. But
this only makes Maxwell’s case stronger, because aberrant theories with only aberrancies
in the realm of the unobservable cannot be rejected on the basis of experimental tests; the
only way to get rid of them seems to adopt thesis U (3) and act in accordance to it.
This transcendental argument is, however, not correct. Let us hold on to Acc (6) and
Exp (9). Then not accepting thesis U (3) implies via Lemma I (11) that not-Ab (2): science
does not reject some aberrant theories but accepts them. Does science, now, come to an
end? Let us see.
Suppose all physicists were to agree to accept aberrant gravitation-theory NG1 rather
than Newton’s regular theory NG (see Section 2.1), in agreement with not-Ab (2). Then
science would accept, and hence would not reject some aberrant theory. But science
would definitely not come an end, let alone become impossible. In general, if scientists
were to accept collectively a single aberrant version of every accepted regular theory, then
science would not come to end. The only difference with science as we know it would be
a few lines in every science book, asserting that a particular aberrancy will be set aside
19Cf. Maxwell (1974: 129), (1998: 192-193). Witness also the gist of this transcendental deduction in the
displayed quotation in the the fifth paragraph of Section 2.1.
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whence-forth. Scientific progress would remain very possible whilst only aberrant theo-
ries were accepted, in blatant contradiction to U (3) — and to EmpU (4).
So it seems we must conclude that Maxwell’s transcendental argument is no good:
wholly rejecting U (3) is fully compatible with the possibility of science and of science
making progress. But let us be charitable and crawl a bit further along this line of reason-
ing.
Suppose now that every time a new theory (model, hypothesis) is proposed, scientists
must convene to decide which aberrant version they choose. That would quickly become
quite a drag. Since there are many scientists, a lot of time and effort would be wasted.
Science would not come to an end all right, but it would progress more (but not much
more) slowly. The need would arise for some general guideline to choose between aber-
rant theories, so that everyone chooses instantly the very same theory (model, hypothe-
sis) and can continue with their research. The simplest guideline we can think of is this
one: choose the regular version, or in other words, adopt thesis U (3) as a methodological
assumption about the universe.
Maxwell could then argue that adopting U is, although admittedly not necessary for
the possibility of science, it certainly is conducive for the growth of scientific knowledge,
and he could submit that this is sufficient to call U substantial. Let us go along and accept
the following sufficient condition for being ‘substantial’:
SignSubst. If accepting or rejecting a thesis makes a significant difference in how fast
science progresses, then the thesis is substantial.
(13)
We have judged Maxwell’s transcendental argument for thesis U (3) being necessary for
the possibility of science to be unconvincing, but we also have judged it convincing for a
weaker thesis, namely the following one:
SignU. Accepting or rejecting thesis U (3) makes a significant difference in how fast
science progresses.
(14)
From SignSubst (13) and SignU (14) we then have:
SubstU. Thesis U (3) is a substantial thesis. (15)
Lemma I (11) and SubstU (15) together trivially imply
Lemma II. Science permanently accepts a substantial thesis about the universe, namely
thesis U (3).
(16)
The last thing we have to establish is whether thesis U (3) is metaphysics.
2.4 What is a Metaphysical Thesis?
Like his philosophical hero K.R. Popper, Maxwell considers ‘scientific’ and ‘metaphysical’
to be predicates of single statements (e.g. hypotheses) and classes of them (e.g. theories).
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But, unlike Popper, who famously took refutability (if needed given a certain amount of
background knowledge) as the criterion for being scientific, Maxwell rejects this criterion
to demarcate science from non-science. Considering what is at stake, namely whether
science presupposes metaphysical theses, one would have expected an elaborate discus-
sion of the subject of demarcation somewhere in Maxwell’s opera. Disapointingly no more
than a single footnote in his magnum opus is devoted to the subject, from which we shall
quote the core passage in full:
A ‘metaphysical’ thesis, as understood here, is a general, factual thesis about the
world which lacks the precision of a physical law or theory, and thus fails to make
the precise empirical predictions of a law or theory.20
Let us immediately formulate what criterion Maxwell uses and then explain it with
the futher sparse material on the subject-matter provided by Maxwell.
Meta. A proposition is metaphysical iff it is a general proposition about the universe
which is imprecise and irrefutable (if needed given a certain amount of background
knowledge).
(17)
The notion of imprecision is vague, but that is precisely how Maxwell wants his con-
ception of metaphysics to be: a proposition about the universe is more scientific, and con-
sequently less metaphysical, if it becomes more precise (ibid.). Maxwell does not provide a
general explication of the notion of precision, but sends the reader to bed with two illus-
trations: ‘All matter is constituted of atoms’ and Newton’s law of universal gravitation
with a completely unspecified constant of gravity are general imprecise proposition about
the universe (ibid.); by themselves, they make no precise testable predictions.
Maxwell’s idea seems to be that the less precise a general proposition about the uni-
verse is, the less capable it is to contradict particular states of affairs, with irrefutability
presumably as the limit of being incapable to contradict any state of affairs whatsoever.
This suggests that irrefutable statements are always imprecise. Anyhow, we have put
both irrefutability and imprecision in Meta (17). We shall not further discuss Meta. In-
stead we focus on the question which is relevant for assessing the Argument, namely
whether thesis U (3) is metaphysical. Certainly U is a general proposition about the
universe. So in order to pronounce U metaphysical, U must be both imprecise and ir-
refutable. If, on the contrary, U turns out to be refutable or precise, Meta (17) permits us
to conclude that U is not metaphysical.
One problem with arguing for the irrefutability of some statement (or class of state-
ments) is familiar from discussions about Popper’s demarcation-criterion. A statement S
(or class ...) is irrefutable iff all implications of S are irrefutable, because as soon as a sin-
gle refutable implication of S is found, this is sufficient (and necessary) to call S refutable.
20Maxwell (1998: 271).
11
We can never reach the conclusion that S is irrefutable because S has infinitely many im-
plications. So if Maxwell wants to establish the metaphysical character of thesis U (3) in
order to arrive at Maxwell’s Thesis (P1), he wants to establish a conclusion that on the
basis of Meta (17) is for humans impossible to establish. Therefore any claim of having
established that thesis U is metaphysical will be a non sequitur.
But perhaps this is too quick. Perhaps one should not invoke what is (not) ‘impossible
for humans’ in a philosophical argument. There are, in fact, cases where we can reach
the verdict of irrefutability. Suppose we verified that four statements by themselves are
irrefutable, say the Russell-Whitehead axioms of classical propositional logic; then ar-
guably their deductive closure also is irrefutable. Hence it is humanly possible to reach
the conclusion that an infinite class of statements is irrefutable. Is this also the case in
U (3)?
Let us consider again a situation we considered in Section 2, where we have Newton’s
theory of universal Gravitation (NG) and the aberrant version with the golden spheres
(NG1). When presented with both NG and NG1, thesis U (3) advices us to prefer NG. But
NG1 is just as refutable as NG is, given a certain amount of background knowledge. Two
golden spheres of 13 km radius which attract each other at some distance in accordance
with Newton’s inverse-square law forms a logically possible state of affairs with observ-
able consequences in conflict with NG1. Hence NG1 is refutable. Suppose, for the sake
of argument, that we find such a state of affairs repeatedly. Then NG1 stands refuted. If
we find that the golden spheres, in fact, repulse each other, then NG stands refuted. This
much is indisputable.
Now what would be the bearing on U (3)? If one wants to hold the permanent (im-
plicit) acceptance of thesis U by science responsible for preferring regular theories over all
aberrant versions — as the reasoning in favour of premises Acc (6) and Exp (9) goes (see
Section 2.2) —, and one praises U (3) for this excellent methodological advice each time
a regular theory is confirmed and a number of its aberrant versions is ipso facto refuted,
then consistency in our behaviour of appraisal requires that one must also hold thesis U
responsible when it persistently gives the wrong advice, as in our example, and then one
should blame U (3) for that. Conversely, if U (3) were never to carry any blame for giving
the wrong advice so as to be immune for refutation, then it could also play no roˆle in
understanding the practice of science. If we were to live in a universe where frequently
aberrant theories turn out to save the phenomena and normal ones do not, then not a
single soul would accept thesis U (3). Our conclusion is that thesis U (3) is vulnerable for
experimental findings, if only via the theories U selects. But this is just to say that thesis
U is refutable and then, by virtue of criterion Meta (17), is not metaphysical.
How about the (lack of) precision of thesis U (3)? Thesis U gives unambiguous advice
to choose between two very precise theories, such as NG and NG1. Then it seems odd to
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call U imprecise. Thesis U (3) will have both refutable and irrefutable consequences, and
both precise and imprecise consequences. Should that render U metaphysical after all?
Surely not. All accepted regular scientific theories also have irrefutable consequences, e.g.
tautologies, and imprecise ones, e.g. NG entails that planets attracht each other inversely
proportional to rn, where 0 < n < 1010. Should we, then, go on and render also all
accepted scientific theories metaphysical?
To summarise, thesis U (3) has an infinitude of precise and refutable implications; it
has ton-loads of precise empirical content. Intuitively such a thesis can hardly be called
metaphysical. Maxwell’s criterion Meta (17) vindicates this intuitive judgment: according
to it, U is definitely not a metaphysical thesis. So the final step, from Lemma II (16) to
Maxwell’s Thesis, which is premise P1 of the Argument, is a non sequitur. Furthermore, it
is difficult to see how U (3) could be called ‘metaphysical’ by weakening criterion Meta
(17) and still having a non-trivial criterion left that would render thesis U metaphysical
and scientific theories not.21
2.5 Assessment of the First Aberrance-Argument
We summarise our assessment of the first aberrance-argument. The logical structure of it
looks like this:
Acc (6) ∧ Exp (9) −→ AccExp (10) ,
AccExp (10) ∧ Ab (2) −→ Lemma I (11) ,
SignSubst (13) ∧ SignU (14) −→ SubstU (15) ,
SubstU (15) ∧ Lemma I (11) −→ Lemma II (16) .
(18)
These four arguments lead to the following conclusion:
(
Acc (6) ∧ Exp (9) ∧ Ab (2) ∧ SignSubst (13) ∧ SignU (14)
)
−→ Lemma II (16) .
(19)
The final step fails:
(
Meta (17) ∧ Lemma II (16)
)
6−→ (P1) Maxwell’s Thesis . (20)
Hence the entire first aberrance-argument fails:
(
Acc (6) ∧ Exp (9) ∧ Ab (2) ∧ SignSubst (13) ∧ SignU (14)
)
6−→ (P1) Maxwell’s Thesis .
(21)
21Logically weakening Meta by replacing ‘iff’ in (17) with ‘if’ or ‘only if’ will not do: if (17) is only a
sufficient condition, we have no ground to call thesis U metaphysical and the non sequitur remains; if (17) is
only a necessary condition, then we have no grounds to call U (3) not metaphysical by virtue of it.
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The acknowledgment that step (20) of the first aberrance-argument makes it a non
sequitur is independent of whatever view one has on science. The same holds for the ac-
ceptance of the premises Ab (2), SignSubst (13) and SignU (14), or so we submit. But it
does not hold for the premises Acc (6) and Exp (9), as we shall see presently. In the context
of assessing the Argument as directed agains Constructive Empiricism (CE), the relevant
question to ask here is whether Acc (6) is objectionable in the eyes of CE. In these eyes,
Acc (6) does not seem plausible, because Acc, going from observable behaviour to un-
observable mental states, smacks too much of an Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation (IBE),
which is a mode of inference that Van Fraassen is very critical about, in particular when it
concerns an explanandum about observables only and an explanans which is about unob-
servables too.22 A proponent of IBE would submit that if someone accepts methodologi-
cal assumption U, then this ‘explains’ why he expects to be successful when following the
associated methodological rule ‘reject aberrant theories’ (2), and this, in turn, ‘explains’
why he actually always follows this rule. This is essentially the kind of explanation we
provide when we say that Nick is eating (observable behaviour) because he is hungry (his
mental state). When we infer from an eating Nick that he is hungry, we make an IBE.
Apart from the question whether this really explains anything (this stuff makes people
sleepy because it has property X and X has a tendency to make people sleepy), anyone
who is critical of IBE in general can now start digging his heels in to resist premise Acc
(6).
To show that premise Acc (6) definitely is an IBE in disguise, it is sufficient to provide
at least one other explanation; then one can go on to ask why accepting thesis U is the best
explanation, and to ask how Maxwell knows there are not more explanations, and to ask
how we know the best one is among the ones we happen to have formulated (it may be ‘a
bad lot’), etc.
To begin with: what other explanation is there for Ab (2) but the acceptance of U (3)?
Well, just as there can be other explanations of why Nick is eating besides him being
hungry (such as: doctor’s orders; it is part of a bet; he is only tasting the food but is not
hungry at all; he proves to his wife that the food is not tainted; etc.), there is an alternative
explanation for following Ab (2). This explanation is thoroughly aesthetical in nature:
science rejects aberrant theories (Ab) because they are ugly; science operates by means of
the following selection-criterion:
Beauty. A theory is accepted iff so far it has saved all the established phenomena which
it is supposed to save and it is beautiful.
(22)
Criterion Beauty (22) does not overtly involve metaphysics. A propounder of Beauty (22)
may look upon Rule Ab (2) as a celebration of a remarkable agreement in ‘subjective
22Fraassen (1989: 131-150).
14
taste’, slight individual differences notwithstanding — a ‘scientific taste’ which is consti-
tutive for the scientific culture.
We can think of even a third explanation for following Ab (2), which is thoroughly
instrumentalist in nature: science rejects aberrant theories (Ab) because they are unneces-
sarily complicated to apply, they have redundant epicycles. Science operates by means of
the following selection-criterion:
Instrument. A theory is accepted iff so far it has saved all the established phenomena
which it is supposed to save and is the most easy of all available theories to apply.
(23)
Just like criterion Beauty (22), Instrument (23) does not overtly involve metaphysics. Un-
like a propounder of Beauty, who speaks about aesthetics and the necessity of beauty to
make our gray and routine-ridden lives a sense of profundity, a propounder of Instru-
ment (23) speaks about applications and efficiency, praises ingeneering and inventing
useful and useless gadgets to make our gray and routine-ridden lives joyful.
Criterion Beauty (22) is not entirely a philosopher’s fiction that has nothing do to with
science as we know it, because certain brilliant physicists considered beautiful theories
to be ends in themselves, such as Dirac, and Weinberg [1992: 165]: “And in any case, we
would not accept any theory as final unless it were beautiful.” Criterion Instrument (23)
seems a little less likely to be such a fiction. Nonetheless we are prepared to adopt the con-
jecture that scientists reject aberrant theories not because these theories go against their
personal, subjective, contingent taste (‘ugly’) or are unnecessarily clumsy to be efficiently
applied, but because scientists are more likely to accept in their hearts that Mother Nature
simply does not work in the way aberrant theories say She works — which is precisely
what thesis U (3) captures. How to justify this conjecture when we cannot ask scientists
because they suffer from having a false consciousness called ‘Standard Empiricism’, as
Maxwell would have it? Anyhow, sceptics about IBE such as Van Fraassen now certainly
have some ground to dig in their heels. Whether or not criteria Beauty (22) and Instru-
ment (23) have anything to do with actual science is irrelevant. What is relevant is that
there is more than one explanation conceivable and this is enough to demonstrate that
Acc (6) is an IBE in disguise.
Perhaps this is the appropriate moment to wave a red flag against Maxwell’s psychi-
atric diagnosis of scientists collectively suffering from a false consciousness (Section 2.2).
We believe it is possible to explain to any individual scientist carefully the issues we have
been discussing so far, drawing the distinctions we have been drawing and will be draw-
ing (e.g. between acceptance and belief); and then go on to ask hin whether he accepts
thesis U (3), or believes U to be true, or counts U to our scientific knowledge about the
universe, then to repeat the same questions about EmpU (4), and so to obtain honest
and fully conscious answers about the issue at hand. We expect that every scientist will
declare at least that he accepts thesis U (3) as a ‘working hypothesis’ until the facts tell
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otherwise, because not making it would slow down the growth of scientific knowledge
considerably, and because no aberrant fact has been established so far. As we shall see, such
acceptance of thesis U, as Lemma I (11) says, and the acknowledgment that U is sub-
stantial, as Lemma II (16) says, do not have the sensational philosophical consequences
Maxwell believes they have.
Hence our conclusion about the first aberrance-argument (18) remains that Lemma II (16)
is plausible, but the step to Maxwell’s Thesis (P1) is a non sequitur because thesis U (3) is
not a metaphysical thesis according to Maxwell’s own criterion Meta (17) — or according
to any non-trivial weakening of Meta for that matter. Critics of IBE, to repeat, will not
even find Lemma II plausible because it relies on the IBE-like premise Acc (6). So it seems
that CE is already in the clear.
2.6 Deductive Logic
There is a second aberrance-argument present in Maxwell’s writings (although it sur-
faced most explicitly in correspondence) which prima facie circumvents the issue of IBE
and purports to be a strictly deductive argument, in particular without having to appeal
to premises Acc (6) or Exp (9). This second aberrance-argument has premise Ab (2) in
common with the first one. Its second premise is the eminently reasonable premise say-
ing that if someone accepts a proposition and this proposition deductively entails another
proposition, then one must accept that other proposition too:
Closed. Acceptance is closed under deduction. (24)
Premise Closed is part of accepting deductive logic, which we take to mean (no more than)
the following: (a) acceptance of all theorems of deductive logic; (b) rejection of all their
negations, notably contradictions; (c) acceptance of a piece of reasoning as valid if in it
only deduction-rules from deductive logic are correctly applied; and (d) acceptance is
closed under deduction, which is Closed. For the sake of future reference, we define:
Logic. Deductive logic is accepted. (25)
Logic trivially implies Closed but not conversely. For ‘deductive logic’ various kinds of
logic can be substituted; in this paper we substitute 1st-order classical predicate logic,
which includes classical propositional logic.
Let us put to rest one worry that may arise here. The worry is that since physics accepts
both Newtonian Gravity (NG) and Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR), physics
by implication accepts contradictions because these theories contradict each other, and
therefore (!) physics rejects deductive logic. This is, however, too quick. Physics certainly
does not accept these two theories unconditionally, but at least in relation to a class of
phenomena, characterised in terms of the scale of certain physical magnitudes. When we
deal with gravitation-phenomena on the grand cosmic scale, GTR is accepted, not NG;
when we deal with gravitation-phenomena and only want a comparably small number
of correct digits in the results of calculations, NG is accepted; and when we deal with
gravitation-phenomena ‘at the Planck-scale’, neither NG nor GTR is accepted. When we
talk about the acceptance of the ‘ontology’ of two conflicting theories, the one (if any) of
the empirically best will be accepted. In these manner the acceptance of contradictions is
avoided.
We now proceed to the second aberrance-argument.
2.7 Assessment of the Second Aberrance-Argument
Suppose physics accepts theory T. Then by virtue of Ab (2), theory T is regular. Let T∗ be
an aberrant version of T. Then T and T∗ contradict each other precisely there where T∗
differs from T; this is logically the same as: if T, then not-T∗. Then physics also accepts
not-T∗, as premise Closed (24) prescribes.
But what is ‘not-T∗’? Recall that T∗ is, for Maxwell, an infinite class of statements. The
statements which T∗ has in common with T must not be denied, otherwise physics is ac-
cepting contradictions; all the others can be denied and these denials belong to ‘not-T∗’,
as long as they are consistent with T. The negations of statements of T∗ that do not be-
long to the language of T, abbreviated by L(T), can be lumped into ‘not-T∗’ without any
danger of contradictions arising. Let us call the ensuing class of statements the Negation
of T∗ with respect to T (with a capital N), denoted by
N(T∗, T) ≡
{
¬S ∈ L(T∗)
∣
∣ S ∈ L(T) −→
(
Con(T, ¬S) ∧ S ∈ T∗
) }
, (26)
where Con(T, ¬S), denoting the consistency of class {T, ¬S}, is defined as no contradic-
tion being derivable from this class of two statements. Since T∗ is arbitrary, we arrive at
the following result:
Lemma III. Science accepts the negation of every aberrant version of an accepted regu-
lar theory T in so far as it is compatible with T, which is to say that science accepts the
Negation N(T∗, T) (26) of every aberrant version T∗ of T.
(27)
Lemma III (27) does not say that science accepts thesis U (3), like Lemma I (11) does.
Or does it? Let us see. Lemma III asserts that science accepts lots of denials and thus
does not accept, and usually rejects, the corresponding affirmations. These denials make
assertions about (certain aspects of) the universe. Hence science accepts an infinitude of
assertions about the universe, all of the type asserting that the universe is not like such
and such (because they are denials). But is accepting all denials of aberrant statements
not tantamount to accepting thesis U that the universe is comprehensible (3)? Clearly, in
17
the light of Lemma III, it is not consistent to accept not-U. That is to say, Lemma III (27)
and Logic (25) imply
Lemma IV. Science does not accept that the universe is incomprehensible, that is to say,
science does not accept not-U (3).
(28)
When we adopt the extremely plausible principle that false theories (and known to be so)
are rejected, and recall that accepting classical logic (25) includes accepting that a non-
false statement is true, then we have the following equivalent formulation of Lemma IV:
Lemma IV’. Science does not accept that the universe is such that it makes even a single
aberrant theory true.
(29)
Lemma IV entails that science does accept thesis U (3) if, and only if, the following
principle is adopted:
Neg. Not accepting a proposition implies accepting its negation. (30)
For if science refuses to accept not-U, principle Neg (30) says that science does accept
the negation of not-U, which is U (according to classical logic a double denial implies an
affirmation). So Lemma IV (28) and Neg together imply Lemma I (11), but Lemma IV (28)
alone does not imply Lemma I.
The logical structure of the second aberrance-argument looks like this:
Logic (25) −→ Closed (24) ,
Ab (2) ∧ Closed (24) −→ Lemma III (27) ,
Lemma III (27) ∧ Logic (25) −→ Lemma IV (28) ,
Lemma IV (28) ∧ Logic (25) ∧ Neg (30) −→ Lemma I (11) .
(31)
This leads to the following valid argument for Lemma I:
Ab (2) ∧ Logic (25) ∧ Neg (30) −→ Lemma I (11) . (32)
In contrast to the first aberrance-argument (18), we have a valid deductive argument
for Lemma I (11) without premises that smack of IBE, which was anathema to CE. But
now we have to ask whether principle Neg (30) is a reasonable premise. Before we answer
this, we point out that Neg is not included in accepting Logic (25).23 To return to our
question, it is one thing to say that every proposition is either true or false, and that one
23Only in the case one has accepted a so-called ‘deductively complete theory’ (meaning: if statement
S is not provable in the theory, then not-S is a theorem), this holds for sentences in the language of that
theory. Such cases are extremely rare; most theories, in so far as investigated by formal means, turn out to
be deductively incomplete.
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either has to accept or not to accept it, but it is quite another thing to say that one either
has to accept every proposition or to accept its denial, which is what principle Neg (30)
entails. It seems perfectly reasonable not to accept a certain proposition and also not to
accept its denial. To put it another way, if principle Neg is reasonable, then doubt or a
neutral attitude is not reasonable anymore, because to doubt a proposition, or remaining
neutral with regard to it, involves precisely neither accepting nor rejecting it. But surely
there is such a thing as reasonable doubt and such a thing as remaining neutral!
So it seems that on the basis of Ab (2) and Closed (24), we cannot reach deductively
beyond Lemma IV (28), in particular we cannot reach Lemma I (11). Then we cannot
reach Maxwell’s Thesis (P1) either.
Finally, it serves to mention that it is quite straightforward to arrive at Lemma I (11)
from Lemma IV (28) by means of an IBE, where Lemma I, then, is the admittedly trivial
explanans and Lemma IV the explanandum: science does not accept that the universe is in-
comprehensible because science permanetly accepts that the universe is comprehensible.
If arrived at Lemma I, and then at Lemma II (16) by virtue of conclusion SubstU (15),
the same problem we faced in the case of the first aberrance-argument stares one in the
face: U is not a metaphysical thesis by virtue of Meta (17) because it boasts with precise
empirical content.
We end by drawing attention to the fact that Standard Empiricism (SE) still stands
firmly on its feet (and so does CE), because without Maxwell’s Thesis (P1), conclusion C1
of the Argument is a non sequitur.
3 Constructive Empiricism Confuted?
In the previous Section we have concentrated on the arguments Maxwell has propounded
in favour of premise P1 of the Argument and we found them unconvincing. But the
Argument also relied on a second contentious premise (P2), asserting that Constructive
Empiricism (CE) is a version of Standard Empiricism (SE). In the present Section we focus
on premise P2. Our conclusion will be that P2 is false, but can be made true when SE is
substantially revised.
3.1 Some Principles of Constructive Empiricism
B.C. van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism (CE) is generally held to be the only well-
developed non-instrumentalist alternative to the varieties of realism; it proudly stands
in the tradition of the Vienna and Berlin Circles.24 We first rehearse a few tenets of CE
which are necessary for our present purposes (we shall label them for the sake of future
24See Fraassen (1980), (1989).
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reference); then we judge Maxwell’s assertions about CE in the Argument, in particular
premise P2.
Fundamental for CE are two distinctions: a distinction between pragmatic acceptance
and epistemic belief, or belief in the truth (two different mental attitudes, each having dif-
ferent implications), and an admittedly vague and anthropomorphic yet perfectly mean-
ingful distinction between observable and unobservable objects. For Van Fraassen, science
is neither a wholly epistemic endeavour (as it was for logical-positivists and is for most if
not all realists) nor a wholly pragmatic endeavour (as it is for instrumentalists), but it is a
mixture of both.
Let T be a scientific theory. T is called empirically adequate iff T saves every relevant
phenomenon, observed or not, in past, present and future of our universe; and T is logi-
cally adequate iff T does not produce contradictions. Consider the following conditional:
If someone accepts theory T, then this involves the belief that T is both logically and
empirically adequate.
(33)
(Since inconsistent theories cannot be empirically adequate, the first necessary condition
of acceptance can be deleted.) A constructive empiricist believes no more about an ac-
cepted theory than what is mentioned in the necessary condition in (33), and remains neu-
tral with regard to any further additions going beyond the actual observable, whereas
a realist believes more, like that the accepted theory is also ontologically adequate, as in
Truth (5), so that it also tells us the truth about what happens in the unobservable part of
the world. Then being a constructive empiricist and being a realist are logically incom-
patible categories; what they share, however, is their obedience of (33).25
Van Fraassen gladly permits scientific virtues such as simplicity, explanatory power,
unifying capacity, and a fortiori being regular (non-aberrant) to play a roˆle in the decision
to accept or to reject a scientific theory (as they unquestionably do), but holds that these
scientific virtues are not epistemic virtues. For CE, the only epistemic virtues are logical
and empirical adequacy. Yet in spite of their being epistemically void, they are scientific
virtues nonetheless, because having them is expedient for reaching the aims of science, in
particular the epistemic aim of science:
(CEP1) Epistemic Aim of Science. The epistemic aim of science is empirical truth,
i.e. the construction of (logically and) empirically adequate theories.
(34)
Let it finally be noted that Van Fraassen is a fastidious epistemologist; he rarely speaks
of ‘knowledge’ or ‘scientific knowledge’. Nevertheless one can identify in CE at least
three genuinely Epistemic Principles; one of which is CEP1 (34), stating what the epis-
temic aim of science is, the other two being the ones below. This should not come as a
25Cf. Fraassen (1980: 8, 12), (1989: 193).
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surprise, because the main product of the fabric of science is knowledge; it would be ex-
tremely awkward if a view of science were devoid of epistemological elements. Below
a accepted scientific proposition is a proposition that is licensed by some accepted scientific
theory.
(CEP2) Epistemic Policy. A proposition counts as scientific knowledge, and is be-
lieved to be true, iff it is an accepted scientific proposition and is about actual
observables only; if the accepted scientific proposition is also or only about un-
observables, it does not belong our scientific knowledge, it is neither believed as
true nor as false (one remains neutral qua belief), but is merely accepted.
(35)
(CEP3) Scientific Virtues. Logical and empirical adequacy are the only two epis-
temic virtues; all other virtues are pragmatic; all scientific virtues, epistemic as
well as pragmatic ones, are permitted to play a part in the decision to accept or
to reject a scientific theory.
(36)
3.2 Constructive Empiricism contradicts Standard Empiricism
For CE, not only the evidence decides whether to accept or to reject a theory (36), contrary
to part SE2 of Maxwell’s characterisation of SE (1) of the Argument. So CE contradicts
SE2 and therefore is not a version of SE. Premise P2 of the Argument is false.
Furthermore, CE contradicts condition SE1 of SE (1), because according to principles
CEP2 (35) and CEP3 (36), CE can accept thesis U saying that the universe is comprehensible
(3). In so far as U has implications about actual observables, principle CEP2 says one must
and therefore surely can believe these implications are true; that is to say, CE commits us
to believing in the truth of EmpU (4) as soon as U is accepted — as Lemma I (11) says that
science does. This contradiction between CE and SE1 leads us, again, to conclude that
premise P2 of the Argument is false.
Surprisingly, we can move beyond mere logical compatibility between accepting the-
sis U (Lemma I) and CE. Van Fraassen has enriched CE with a ‘libertarian’ concept of ra-
tionality which is supposed to be understood as ‘bridled irrationality’: believing a propo-
sition is rational iff one is not compelled to disbelieve it; hence irrational iff one is com-
pelled to disbelieve it.26 One remarkable consequence is that believing in the existence of
electrons, something which goes against epistemic principle CEP2 (35), is deemed ratio-
nal, as is disbelieving it and as is remaining neutral about it. From these consequences it
should not be concluded that CE has become inconsistent, but that CE embraces a ‘liber-
tarian’ notion of rationality that can make contradicting conceptions of science rational.
We now submit that qua scientists scientists are compelled to act in accordance to method-
ological assumption U (3) in order not to slow down needlessly the process of progress-
ing towards the aim of science (34). Then it is irrational for science to reject thesis U and
26Fraassen (1989: 171-172).
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not follow the associated methodological rule ‘reject aberrant theories’. Therefore it cer-
tainly is rational to accept U and act accordingly. With rationality backing us up, we now
have moved beyond mere logical compatibility between accepting thesis U (3) and CE,
as promised — and this conclusion is even more painfully dissonant to premise P2 of the
Argument.
3.3 Two Varieties of Standard Empiricism
Lately Maxwell (1998: 37) has drawn a distinction between two varieties of SE (our em-
phasis):
We can, in fact, distinguish two versions of SE which differ on just this question of
whether empirical considerations ought alone to determine choice of theory in sci-
ence, or whether simplicity considerations [e.g. whether being regular or aberrant —
FAM] are important and legitimate in addition to empirical considerations. Let us call
the first view bare SE (bSE) and the second dressed SE (dSE).
So far we have been considering the bare version (bSE); it was twice incompatible with CE
and therefore rendered premise P2 twice false (Section 3.2). Let us see whether a version
of the Argument with dressed SE (dSE), rather than bare SE (bSE), can touch CE.
Clearly the weakening of bSE to dSE that Maxwell considers only affects SE2 (Maxwell:
“differ on just this question ...”), not SE1 (1). Thus we now have:
Dressed Standard Empiricism (dSE). (SE1) Science does not accept any permanent,
substantial, metaphysical assumptions about the universe (independent of the evidence
and certainly never in violation of the evidence) (1); and (dSE2) the decision to accept
or to reject a scientific theory is generally based on empirical grounds (the available
evidence) and non-empirical grounds (regularity, simplicity, explanatory force, unifying
power and perhaps more).
(37)
CE endorses dSE2 (37) wholeheartedly because principle CEP3 (36) of CE entails dSE2.
But CE remains incompatible with dSE because, as we demonstrated in the previous Sec-
tion, it is incompatible with SE1 (1), which is part of dSE (37). Hence we conclude that the
move from bare to dressed SE in order to make trouble for CE helps but it does not help
enough. CE is a more liberal species of empiricism than both bSE (SE (1)) and dSE (37),
and therefore immune for the Argument. Premise P2 of the Argument remains false.
3.4 A Third Variety of Standard Empiricism
In contradiction to the conclusion we have just drawn, namely that CE is neither a variety
of bare SE nor of dressed SE, Maxwell claims that CE is a variety of bSE:
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However, Van Fraassen is emphatic that only empirical considerations can legitimately
decide what is accepted as scientific knowledge, simplicity having here no role to play
whatsoever: it is this that makes him a proponent of bare SE.27
When Maxwell claims that in CE “only empirical considerations can legitimately de-
cide what is accepted as scientific knowledge”, he misunderstands CE, because prior to
finding out whether a proposition is about actual observables only (the stage where “only
empirical considerations ...”), it first needs to be ascertained whether this proposition is
part of an accepted scientific theory and at that stage non-empirical considerations can
legitimately help to reach a decision of acceptance or rejection CEP3 (36); in the entire
two-stage process of deciding whether a proposition is accepted as knowledge not only
empirical considerations are legitimate. Maxwell has unjustifiably ignored the first stage.
What Van Fraassen (1980: 4) means when he says things like “. . . pragmatic virtues
do not give us any reason over and above the evidence of the empirical data for thinking
that a theory is true,” is that these virtues play no roˆle at the second stage; their roˆle is
restricted to the first stage. If we have two empirically equivalent theories and one evi-
dently has more explanatory power than the other one, then we accept that one because
we think this move is conducive for reaching the aim of science (34); but we do not be-
lieve that the explanatory theory is closer to the truth, more likely to be true, or whatever
genuinely epistemic concept (by the lights of CE) you want to use here. The dunghill of
history is filled with false explanatory theories.
The only way to save what Maxwell is trying to say here is to take him as shifting
the entire Argument from the pragmatic stage of acceptance & rejection simpliciter to the
epistemic stage of acceptance & rejection as scientific knowledge. This interpretation is in
harmony with Maxwell more recent formulations of SE, in particular of SE1:28
no substantial thesis about the world being permanently upheld as a part of scientific
knowledge independently of empirical considerations.
We point out that here the “substantial thesis” is no longer called ‘metaphysical’, as in
his (1974) passim. But since in Maxwell’s own conception of science the whole of knowl-
edge is subdivided in 10 levels and he calls all levels beyond level 1 (the evidence) and
level 2 (theories) “metaphysical, cosmological assumptions concerning the comprehensi-
bility and knowability of the universe” (1998: 6), we can be certain that the “substantial
thesis” in the quotation displayed above deserves to be called metaphysical.29
27Maxwell (1998: 38).
28In Maxwell (1998: 2); cf. Maxwell (2002: 1-2).
29Cf. Maxwell (1993: 66-69), (2002), and Section 3.6 for this topic.
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Let us thus define ‘revised dressed Standard Empiricism’ as follows:
Revised dressed Standard Empiricism (dSE*). (SE1*) Science does not accept any
permanent, substantial, metaphysical assumptions about the universe (independent of
the evidence and certainly never in violation of the evidence) as a part of scientific
knowledge; and (dSE2) the decision to accept or to reject a scientific theory is gen-
erally based on empirical grounds (the available evidence) and non-empirical grounds
(regularity, simplicity, explanatory force, unifying power and perhaps more) (37).
(38)
In comparison to dressed Standard Empiricism (dSE) (37), this revised version of it (dSE*)
has a different, stronger first conjunct: SE1* rather than SE1 (37); in comparison to Stan-
dard Empiricism (SE), this revised version of dressed Standard Empiricism (dSE*) has
two different conjuncts: the stronger SE1* rather than SE1 (1) and the weaker dSE2 (37)
rather than SE2 (1).
Another way of putting Maxwell’s move from dressed SE (37) to dSE* (38) is to say
that he surreptitiously changes the meaning of ‘acceptance’: from acceptance in Van
Fraassen’s sense of pragmatic acceptance simpliciter to acceptance in Van Fraassen’s sense
of epistemic acceptance, as being ‘part of scientific knowledge’. If we were to put it like
this, then another line of attack on CE would ensue, because also in this sense Maxwell
would not commit the fallacy of equivocation with respect to ‘acceptance’, provided we
change the meaning of ‘acceptance’ everywhere in the Argument accordingly and take
‘scientific knowledge’ in Van Fraassen’s sense — otherwise another fallacy of equivoca-
tion would be committed. And if SE1 (1) was always intended to be understood as SE1*
(38), then what follows next is directed at the Argument thus understood.
The global logical structure of the Argument (Section 1) remains unaffected by these
surreptitious changes, but we now have to review our assessment of premises P1 and
P2. Premise P2 now reads that CE is a version of Revised dressed Standard Empiricism
(dSE*) because it meets both of its characterising conjuncts, SE1* (38) and dSE2 (37). We
have already seen that CE meets dSE2. Does it meet SE1* too? When metaphysical theses
are such that they do not stick their neck out to face the tribunal of sense experience, in
agreement with Meta (17), CE will never consider such theses as candidates for entering
the body of scientific knowledge, in agreement with requirement SE1* (38). Hence CE is
a version of revised dressed Standard Empiricism (dSE*), which makes premise P2 of the
revised Argument true. So far so good.
But now to make premise P1 true, or at least plausible, it is insufficient for an aberrance-
argument to establish that science accepts thesis U that the universe is comprehensible (3),
as Lemma I (11) asserts. One must establish a logically stronger version of Lemma I (11),
namely that science accepts U as part of scientific knowledge in Van Fraassen’s sense; from
this we then have to go to a stronger, epistemic version of Maxwell’s Thesis P1. Let us
consider the two aberrance-arguments in turn, which are supposed to ground premise
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P1.
Revised First Aberrance-Argument. This argument clearly needs a stronger version of
AccExp (10); namely the following one:
AccExp*. IF science always follows method M (for reaching some aim, A say), and
never goes against it although nothing prevents science from doing so, THEN the con-
comitant methodological assumption U[M,A] that the universe is such that following
method M is of considerable help (for reaching A) belongs to the scientific knowledge of
the universe.
(39)
The ensuing argument arriving at an epistemic version of Lemma I (11) begins to look
suspiciously much like a petitio principii: if one is prepared to accept premise AccExp*
(39) without further argument, then one might as well accept an epistemic verision of
Lemma I right away.
But in fact, assumption AccExp* (39) is not plausible. Since for CE what belongs to
our scientific knowledge is the object of true belief and can only involve actual observ-
ables, assumption AccExp* is, then, telling us we can read off (what scientists’ take to be)
scientific knowledge from their observable behaviour. This is generally implausible: one
can act against one’s own beliefs: out of desperation, or out of habit, to please someone
you love, and so forth. We are dealing here, in assumption AccExp* (39), with a fully
fledged IBE. This is sufficient to conclude that CE — a sworn enemy of IBE — is certainly
not compelled to accept premise AccExp* of the revised first aberrance-argument.
Furthermore, we want to point out the following. For CE, the pragmatic acceptance
of thesis U (3) already involves an epistemic commitment according to CEP2 (35) of CE,
namely to believe that thesis U (3) is empirically true, i.e. that thesis EmpU (4) is true. This
is to say that EmpU is part of our scientific knowledge of the universe in Van Fraassen’s
sense! If Maxwell were to respond that counting EmpU to our scientific knowledge is not
enough, and that CE must count the logically stronger thesis U to our scientific knowl-
edge, then this would be tantamount to demanding CE to betray one of its constitutive
epistemic principles (CEP2), namely to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the
actual observable (35). But the debate whether this principle (CEP2) is good or bad is
quite another debate; more importantly, Maxwell did neither direct the Argument against
this principle nor did this principle play a part in the Argument. The conclusion is that
Lemma I (11) implies, for CE, that EmpU (4) is part of scientific knowledge. Since this is
not in conflict with CE, this provides no ground for the rejection of CE.
Revised Second Aberrance-Argument. See above.
Our assessment is that the revised Argument, with revised dressed Standard Empiri-
cism (38) replacing Standard Empiricism (1) and concomitantly revised premises, is an
improvement on the original Argument because it turns the false premise P2 into a true
one. But the revised Argument is a deterioration when it comes to premise P1; the original
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aberrance-arguments could plausibly reach Lemma I, stating that science accepts thesis
U (3), but a revised Lemma I, stating that science counts U to our scientific knowledge, can
no longer be reached plausibly because the IBE-type premise AccExp* (39) is not quite at
home in CE.
3.5 Varieties of Acceptance
In the present context, prima facie five notions of ‘acceptance’ are to be distinguished:30
(Acc) Van Fraassen’s pragmatic acceptance of a proposition, with or without some
particular aim in mind.
(T) Van Fraassen’s epistemic acceptance of a proposition, acceptance of it as part
of our scientific knowledge (in Van Fraassen’s sense of about actual observables
only), of belief in its truth.
(Post) Maxwell’s acceptance as ‘part of our conjectural a posteriori scientific
knowledge’.
(Post) Maxwell’s acceptance as ‘part of our permanent a priori scientific knowl-
edge’.
(Sc) Acceptance as understood by science (whathever that is).
(40)
A systematic comparison of all five notions is not needed for our present purposes of crit-
icising Maxwell. But to keep seeing the wood between the trees, and, more importantly,
to prevent any worries about our critical analyses from arising in this light, the following
remarks should be enough.
Maxwell intends his (Post) to be the same as (Sc). This collapses one distinction. Next,
in order not to let Maxwell commit the fallacy of equivocation with respect to ‘acceptance’
in his criticism of CE, each of (Acc) and (T) can be chosen in the Argument, provided we
choose consistently. This is precisely what we have done in the previous Sections: on
both accounts the Argument against CE failed. So we now only need to consider the two
other notions of acceptance which are left: (Prior) and (Post).
If Maxwell were to use ‘acceptance’ in the Argument in any of his two senses of (Prior)
or (Post), and not in any of Van Fraassen’s two senses of (Acc) or (T), he might still have
evaded the charge of committing the fallacy of equivocation, because certain logical re-
lations seem to obtain between his and Van Fraassen’s notions of acceptance. Maxwell
could, perhaps, erect some version of the Argument on the basis of these logical relations.
We believe, however, that the prospects for this project are dark, as we shall finally argue.
Since (Post) certainly implies (Acc), the premises of a version of the Argument using
(Post) imply the premises of the Argument with (Acc). We therefore can reject the ver-
30Fraassen (1980: 11-13, 46, 88), (1989: 191-193), Maxwell (1998: 20).
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sion of the Argument with (Post) as soon as we reject the version with (Acc). But this is
precisely what we have done already. And mutatis mutandis for (Prior), because (Prior)
certainly implies (T).
3.6 Farewell to Metaphysics?
In the previous Sections we have seen that Maxwell’s Thesis (P1) does not follow from
Lemma II (16) by means of Meta (17) and that the prospects of weakening Meta seemed
dark because thesis U (3) is filled with precise empirical content. Now what if Maxwell
simply deletes ‘metaphysical’ altogether everywhere in the Argument and is satisfied
with Lemma II?
Well, first of all, this move will take a sting out of the Argument. The slogan of the Ar-
gument — Science Presupposes Metaphysics! —, which attracts the attention of the philoso-
pher of science, then must go. Is there anything philosophically exciting left after this
move? Let us see.
Deleting ‘metaphysical’ everywhere yields yet another weakened version of SE, a ver-
sion to be sure which is no longer hostile to making metaphysical assumptions. The view
which then seems to be under fire of the Argument we call ‘Heraclitism’ (after the pre-
Socratic philosopher who said Panta rhei):
Heraclitism. Science does not accept any permanent, substantial assumptions about
the universe.
(41)
To relate Heraclitism (41) to SE (1): it is a further weakening of its first conjunct (SE1), and
it has no second conjunct.
The drawback of this move is that Heraclitism (41) sits less comfortably in the philo-
sophical tradition called ‘empiricism’. This tradition is characterised by its anti-metaphysical
attitude, as expressed in SE1 (1) and in SE1* (38). Thus we can hardly call Heraclitism (41)
a ‘fourth variety of Standard Empiricism’. For reasons that by now need not be rehearsed,
a revised premise P2, stating that ‘CE is a version of Heraclitism’, is false. Nothing in CE
forbids us to accept permanently some substantial thesis U (3) if this helps to achieve the
aim of science (34).
Further, we need to ask whether there is some conception of science explicitly de-
fended by some current philosopher of science that includes Heraclitism. Is there really
an ‘official ideology’ of science that proudly embraces Heraclitism (41)? If there is, then
Maxwell has a case against it by means of the first aberrance-argument (18) — charita-
bly glossing over possible qualms about IBE with regard to premise AccExp (10). But
before it is established beyond reasonable doubt that Heraclitism (41) belongs to the ‘offi-
cial ideology’ of science, an attack with the first aberrance-argument will result in a sham
fight. This is however not to say that the rejection of Heraclitism (41) by science is not an
interesting insight into the nature of science.
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4 Exitum: What to Conclude?
Summary. Our overall conclusion is that Maxwell has made it plausible that science per-
manently pragmatically accepts a thesis about the universe (as Lemma I (11) says), namely
that the universe is comprehensible, i.e. is such that it makes every aberrant theory false;
this thesis U (3) is substantial (Lemma II, (16)) in that it helps science considerably to
reach its epistemic aim (15); but thesis U is not metaphysical (17), because it carries loads of
precise empirical content or is at least vulnerable to the results of empirical inquiry. Thus
Maxwell has failed to make plausible Maxwell’s Thesis, which is premise P1 of his Argu-
ment (Section 1) against Standard Empiricism (SE), and is the purported consequence of
Lemma I (11). Hence Maxwell has also failed to make a case against Constructive Em-
piricism (CE) if CE had been a version of SE. Both ‘aberrance-arguments’ (18) and (31)
we have discerned do not establish Maxwell’s Thesis (P1). So as things stand, the step to
conclusion C1 of the Argument is a non sequitur. Moreover, premise P2 of the Argument,
asserting that CE is a version of SE, turned out to be false.
The revised versions of SE we have considered also fail. The move from ‘bare’ to
‘dressed’ SE did not affect our assessment of premise P1 as being groundless — and hence
was of no avail —, and both versions of SE did not turn the false premise P2 into a true
one. The further move from ‘dressed’ to ‘revised dressed’ SE (dSE* (38)), at last, made CE
a version of it (dSE*), and this, in turn, made premise P2 true. But because of the epistemic
nature of dSE* (due to the phrase “as a part of scientific knowledge”), the aberrance-
arguments performed even worse to establish the then needed, stronger, epistemic ver-
sion of Maxwell’s Thesis (P1), now to be formulated in terms of ‘accepting a thesis as
part of our scientific knowledge’. One reason is that Inferences-to-the-Best-Explanation (IBE)
were needed to establish an epistemic version of Lemma I (now asserting that science
counts thesis U to belong to our scientific knowledge of the universe), which is a type of
inference that has been severely criticised by Van Fraassen and is definitely not part of CE
— ironically, Maxwell rejects IBE too.
Lessons. Does Maxwell’s attack, then, has taught us nothing valuable at all? Not so.
We have learned the following four lessons.
I. Science acts scrupulously in accordance with the methodological rule ‘reject aber-
rant theories and accept only regular ones’ (2) and therefore pragmatically accepts
a very general methodological assumption about the universe, namely thesis U as-
serting that all aberrant theories are false (3).
II. Bare Standard Empiricism (SE) is a false conception of science because of its false
conjunct SE2 (1).
III. Constructive Empiricism (CE) can accept thesis U (3) and can justify this accep-
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tance, first, by pointing out that following the associated methodological rule (2)
helps science significantly to achieve its epistemic aim, which is the construction of
empirically adequate theories (34); and, secondly, by arguing on the basis of CE’s
libertarian view of rationality that it is irrational to reject U (3) and act accordingly.
IV. CE can even believe that thesis U (3) is empirically true and can count thesis EmpU (4)
to our scientific knowledge of the universe (in CE’s sense of about actual observ-
ables only), because U boasts with precise empirical content and so far has survived
every experimental test.
Perhaps these four lessons I-IV offer but cold comfort for Maxwell, in particular in the
light of his Mission Destroy of CE, which has not been successful. We value these lessons,
because they have enhanced our understanding of both science and CE.
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